LAW NOTES
PROBLEMS AFTER
CRUELTY TRIALS

S

ome of the more exasperating aspects of prosecutions of defendants charged
with cruelty or neglect can occur after the trial-the stage of
the proceeding when a sentence
is imposed and the court decides upon the disposition of
the animals involved. In the
worst-case scenario, even if a
conviction is obtained, a judge
feels constrained by a statute
limiting punishment to fine or
imprisonment and actually
orders the return of the animal
to the convicted defendant, a
disposition that usually
makes little sense from the
point of view of the animal's
welfare. In other cases, similar
perceived constraints often prevent the judge from prohibiting
future ownership of animals by
the defendant or thwart more
creative sentencing, such as
allowing the defendant to keep
animals but under the official
supervision of a local humane
society, which would have the
right to enter and inspect the
defendant's premises at will.
The cost of keeping the animal
prior to and during the trial can
also be problematic. Frequently , the local society or authorities must maintain the defendant's animal at considerable
cost for several weeks-or
even several months-pending
trial. At the conclusion of the
trial, in the absence of a statute
allowing the court to levy such
costs directly upon the defendant, the animals often become
a kind of fmancial footballmere collateral which are sold
or auctioned off, to an unknown fate , in order to satisfy
such costs .
While these problems vary
in severity from state to state,
ccpcnding upon the post-trial

Animals involved in cruelty cases, such as these dogs seized by
humane agents in rural New York in 1987, often pose a problem
to courts faced with their disposition after trial.
procedural statute under which
a given state's courts operate,
the number of disturbing incidents reported to the HSUS
general counsel's office suggests a need for a model posttrial procedural statute centered
upon the welfare of the animals
involved. Under no circumstances should an animal
be returned to a defendant actually convicted of cruelty or
neglect. The post-trial procedural statute should provide
for forfeiture of not only the
animals that were the actual
victims of cruelty or neglect,
but also, arguably, all animals
kept by a convicted defendant.
Such animals should be placed
with a local humane society for
adoption, other placement, or,
when circumstances warrant,
euthanasia. If the defendant is
allowed to keep animals other
than the ones involved in the
prosecution, the court should
be empowered to order that the
defendant's keeping of such
animals be subject to the supervision of a local humane soci-

ety or other knowledgeable
authority.
The costs of maintaining the
animal during the prosecution
should be levied directly
against the defendant's income
and assets other than the
animals involved, and procedures should ensure that the
animals do not become mere
collateral or end up in the
hands of dealers during an auction or other forced sale to
satisfy the case costs.
Ideally, even an acquittal
should not end the court's intervention on behalf of an
animal. An acquittal may simply mean that the state has not
met its burden of presenting
enough evidence to prove each
element of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. There may
still have been substantial
evidence of abuse or neglect
even when the defendant is
found not guilty of the charges
against him or her. Consequently, a progressive statute
should provide for a postacquittal custody hearing in

which the court would determine, in light of the best interests of the animal, whether
the defendant is a fit person to
have custody of the animal. In
so determining , the court
should take into account a
variety of evidence, including
testimony not admissible in a
criminal trial, and should have
the power, if the animal is
returned to the defendant, to
impose conditions or to order
supervision or monitoring by
humane officials.
Such provisions would
amount to a minor revolution
in the interaction of criminal
procedure and animal-welfare
law in that the proceedings
would focus less on the punishment of the defendant and
more on the overall, long-term
welfare of the animals involved. In providing for a postacquittal custody hearing and
not making the ultimate fate of
the animal automatically depend upon the outcome of the
criminal trial, a progressive
statute would signal a shift
away from regarding animals
merely as property or evidence
and more toward a concept of
animals as, in the words of the
Court of Appeals of Georgia,
''the special watch and ward''
of the state, similar to the status
minor children currently have
in law .
The general counsel's office
would welcome receiving reports from local societies or
humane activists who have experienced similar or different
problems after trials of cruelty
cases, so that we may be able
to take such information into
account in completing the
drafting of the model statute. •
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